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We propose a model of inference and heuristic decision making in groups that is rooted in the Bayes
rule but avoids the complexities of rational inference in partially observed environments with incomplete
information. According to our model, the group members behave rationally at the initiation of their interac-
tions with each other; however, in the ensuing decision epochs, they rely on a heuristic that replicates their
experiences from the first stage. Subsequently, the agents use their time-one Bayesian update and repeat
it for all future time-steps; hence, updating their actions using a so-called Bayesian heuristic. This model
avoids the complexities of fully rational inference and also provides a behavioral and normative foundation
for non-Bayesian updating. It is also consistent with a dual-process psychological theory of decision mak-
ing, where a controlled (conscious/slow) system develops the Bayesian heuristic at the beginning, and an
automatic (unconscious/fast) system takes over the task of heuristic decision making in the sequel.
We specialize this model to a group decision scenario where private observations are received at the
beginning, and agents aim to take the best action given the aggregate observations of all group members.
We present the implications of the choices of signal structure and action space for such agents. We show
that for a wide class of distributions from the exponential family the Bayesian heuristics take the form of
an affine update in the self and neighboring actions. Furthermore, if the priors are non-informative (and
possibly improper), then these action updates become a linear combination. We investigate the requirements
on the modeling parameters for the action updates to constitute a convex combination as in the DeGroot
model. The results reveal the nature of assumptions that are implicit in the DeGroot updating and highlights
the fragility and restrictions of such assumptions; in particular, we show that for a linear action update to
constitute a convex combination the precision or accuracy of private observations should be balanced among
all neighboring agents, requiring a notion of social harmony or homogeneity in their observational abilities.
Following the DeGroot model, agents reach a consensus asymptotically. We derive the requirements on the
signal structure and network topology such that the consensus action aggregates information efficiently. This
involves additional restrictions on the signal likelihoods and network structure. In the particular case that
all agents observe the same number of i.i.d. samples from the same distribution, then efficiency arise in
degree-regular balanced structures, where all nodes listen to and hear from the same number of neighbors.
We next shift attention to a finite state model, in which agents take actions over the probability simplex;
thus revealing their beliefs to each other. We show that the Bayesian heuristics, in this case, prescribe a
log-linear update rule, where each agent’s belief is set proportionally to the product of her own and neigh-
boring beliefs. We analyze the evolution of beliefs under this rule and show that agents reach a consensus.
The consensus belief is supported over the maximizers of a weighted sum of the log-likelihoods of the initial
observations. Since the weights of the signal likelihoods coincide with the network centralities of their respec-
tive agents, these weights can be equalized in degree-regular and balanced topologies, where all nodes have
the same in and out degrees. Therefore, in such highly symmetric structures the support of the consensus
belief coincides with the maximum likelihood estimators (MLE) of the truth state; and here again, balanced
regular structures demonstrate a measure of efficiency. Nevertheless, the asymptotic beliefs systematically
reject the less probable alternatives in spite of the limited initial data, and in contrast with the optimal
(Bayesian) belief of an observer with complete information of the environment and private signals. The
latter would assign probabilities proportionally to the likelihood of every state, without rejecting any of the
possible alternatives. The asymptotic rejection of less probable alternatives indicates a case of group polar-
ization, i.e. overconfidence in the group aggregate that emerges as a result of the group interactions. Unlike
the linear action updates and the DeGroot model which entail a host of knife-edge conditions on the signal
structure and model parameters, we observe that the belief updates are unweighted; not only they effectively
internalize the heterogeneity of the private observations, but also they compensate for the individual priors.
Thence, we are led to the conclusion that multiplicative belief updates, when applicable provide a relatively
robust description of the decision making behavior.
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1. Introduction. Daniel Kahneman in his highly acclaimed work, “Thinking, Fast and Slow”,
points out that the proper way to elicit information from a group is not through a public discus-
sion but rather confidentially collecting each person’s judgment [52, Chapter 23]. Indeed, decision
making among groups of individuals exhibit many singularities and important inefficiencies that
lead to Kahneman’s noted advice. As a team converges on a decision expressing doubts about the
wisdom of the consensus choice is suppressed; subsequently teams of decision makers are afflicted
with groupthink as they appear to reach a consensus.1 The mechanisms of uncritical optimism,
overconfidence, and the illusions of validity in group interactions also lead to group polarization,
making the individuals more amenable toward extreme opinions [92].
In more abstract terms, agents in a social network exchange opinions to benefit from each other’s
experience and information when making decisions about adoption of technologies, purchasing
products, voting in elections and so on. The problem of social learning is to characterize and
understand such interactions and it is a classical focus of research in microeconomics [45, Chapter
8], [39, Chapter 5], [18]. Research on formation and evolution of beliefs in social networks and
subsequent shaping of the individual and group behaviors have attracted much attention amongst
diverse communities in engineering [58, 97], statistics [66], economics [47, 65], and sociology [82].
An enhanced understanding of decision making and learning in social networks sheds light on
the role of individuals in shaping public opinion and how they influence efficiency of information
transmissions. These in turn help us improve our predictions about group behavior and provide
guidelines for designing effective social and organizational policies.
1.1. Rational social learning. The rational approach advocates application of Bayes rule to
the entire sequence of observations successively at every step. However, such repeated applications
of Bayes rule in networks become very complex, especially if the agents are unaware of the global
network structure; and as they use their local data to make inferences about all possible contin-
gencies that can lead to their observations. While some analytical properties of rational learning
is deduced and studies in the literature [32, 1, 68, 66, 42], their tractable modeling and analysis
remains an important problem in network economics and continues to attract attention.
Some of the earliest results addressing the problem of social learning are due to Banerjee (1992)
[9], and Bikhchandani et al. (1998) [13] who consider a complete graph structure where the agent’s
observations are public information and also ordered in time, such that each agent has access to
the observations of all the past agents. These assumptions help analyze and explain the interplay
between public and private information leading to fashion, fads, herds etc. Later results by Gale
and Kariv [32] relax some of these assumptions by considering the agents that make simultane-
ous observations of only their neighbors rather than the whole network, but the computational
complexities limit the analysis to networks with only two or three agents. In more recent results,
Mueller-Frank [68] provides a framework of rational learning that is analytically amenable. Mossel,
Sly and Tamuz [66] analyze the problem of estimating a binary state of the world from a single
initial private signal that is independent and identically distributed amongst the agents conditioned
on the true state; and they show that by repeatedly observing each other’s best estimates of the
unknown as the size of the network increases with high probability Bayesian agents asymptotically
learn the true state. Hence, the agents are able to combine their initial private observations and
learn the truth. Further results by Kanoria and Tamuz [53] provide efficient algorithms to calculate
each agent’s estimate in the case of tree networks.
On the one hand, the properties of rational learning models are difficult to analyze beyond some
simple asymptotic facts such as convergence. On the other hand, these models make unrealistic
1Gar Klein proposes a famous method of project premortem to overcome the groupthink through an exercise: imagining
that the the planned decision was failed in implementation and writing a brief report of the failure [57].
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assumptions about the complexity and amount of computations that agents perform before com-
mitting to a decision. To avoid these shortcomings, an alternative “non-Bayesian” approach relies
on simple and intuitive heuristics that are descriptive of how agents aggregate the reports of their
neighbors before coming up with a decision.
1.2. Heuristic decision making. Heuristics are used widely in the literature to model social
interactions and decision making [34, 35, 36]. They provide tractable tools to analyze boundedly
rational behavior and offer insights about decision making under uncertainty. Hegselmann and
Krause [43] investigate various ways of averaging to model opinion dynamics and compare their
performance for computations and analysis. Using such heuristics one can avoid the complexities of
fully rational inference, and their suitability are also verified in experimental studies by Grimm and
Mengel [40] and Chandrasekhar, Larreguy and Xandri [19]. The study of such heuristics started in
1974 with the seminal work of DeGroot [20] in linear opinion pooling, where agents update their
opinions to a convex combination of their neighbors’ beliefs and the coefficients correspond to the
level of confidence that each agent puts in each of her neighbors. More recently, Jadbabaie, Molavi
and Tahbaz-Salehi [47, 48, 65] consider a variation of this model for streaming observations, where in
addition to the neighboring beliefs the agents also receive private signals. Despite their widespread
applications, theoretical and axiomatic foundations of social inferences using heuristics and non-
Bayesian updates have received limited attention and only recently [65, 69], and a comprehensive
theory of non-Bayesian learning that reconciles the rational and boundedly rational approaches
with the widely used heuristics remains in demand. The main goal of our paper is to address this
gap and to do so from a behavioral perspective.
A dual process theory for the psychology of mind and its operation identifies two systems of
thinking [24]: one that is fast, intuitive, non-deliberative, habitual and automatic (system one);
and a second one that is slow, attentive, effortful, deliberative, and conscious (system two).1 Major
advances in behavioral economics are due to incorporation of this dual process theory and the
subsequent models of bounded rationality [51]. Reliance on heuristics for decision making is a
distinctive feature of system one that avoids the computational burdens of a rational evaluation;
system two on the other hand, is bound to deliberate on the options based on the available infor-
mation before making recommendations. The interplay between these two systems and how they
shape the individual decisions is of paramount importance [17].
Tversky and Kahneman argue that humans have limited time and brainpower, therefore they
rely on simple rules of thumb, i.e. heuristics, to help them make judgments. However, the use of
these heuristics causes people to make predictable errors and subjects them to various biases [96].
Hence, it is important to understand the nature and properties of heuristic decision making and
its consequences to individual and organizational choice behavior. This premise underlies many of
the recent advances in behavioral economics [93], and it motivates our work as well.
1.3. Our contribution. In this work we are concerned with the operations of system one: we
aim to study heuristics for information aggregation in group decision scenarios when the relevant
information is dispersed among many individuals. In such situations, individuals in the group are
subjected to informational (but not strategic) externalities. By the same token, the heuristics that
are developed for decision making in such situations are also aimed at information aggregation.
In our model as the agent experiences with her environment her initial response would engage
1While many decision science applications focus on developing dual process theories of cognition and decision mak-
ing (cf. [25, 63] and the references therein); other researchers identify multiple neural systems that derive decision
making and action selection: ranging from reflexive and fast (Pavlovian) responses to deliberative and procedural
(learned) ones; and these systems are in turn supported by several motoric, perceptual, situation-categorization and
motivational routines which together comprise the decision making systems [80, Chapyter 6].
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her system two: she rationally evaluates the reports of her neighbors and use them to make a
decision. However, after her initial experience and by engaging in repeated interactions with other
group members her system one takes over her decision processes, implementing a heuristic that
imitates her (rational/Bayesian) inferences from her initial experience; hence avoiding the burden
of additional cognitive processing in the ensuing interactions with her neighbors.
On the one hand, our model of inference based on Bayesian (initial) heuristics is motivated by
the real-world behavior of people induced by their system one and reflected in their spur-of-the-
moment decisions and impromptu behavior: basing decisions only on the immediately observed
actions and disregarding the history of the observed actions or the possibility of correlations among
different observations; i.e. “what you see is all there is” [52]. On the other hand, Bayesian heuristics
offer a boundedly rational approach to model decision making over social networks. The latter is
in the sense of the word as coined by Herbert A. Simon: to incorporate modifications that lead to
substantial simplifications in the original choice problem [87].1 This in contrast with the Bayesian
approach which is not only unrealistic in the amount of cognitive burden that it imposes on the
agents, but also is often computationally intractable and complex to analyze.
Our main contribution is to offer a normative framework for heuristic decision making, by relying
on the time-one Bayesian update and using it for all future decision epochs. This model offers a
behavioral foundation for non-Bayesian updating that is compatible with the dual-process psycho-
logical theory of decision making. In Section 2, we describe the mathematical details of our model;
in particular, we explain the mathematical steps for deriving the so-called Bayesian heuristics in
a given decision scenario. Specific cases of Bayesian heuristics that we explore in the following
sections are the log-linear (multiplicative) updating of beliefs over the probability simplex, and the
linear (weighted arithmetic average) updating of actions over the Euclidean space. In Section 3, we
specialize our group decision model to a setting involving exponential family of distributions for
both signal likelihoods and agents’ beliefs. The agents aim to estimate the expected values of the
sufficient statistics for their signal structures. We show that the Bayesian heuristics in this case
are affine rules in the self and neighboring actions, and we give explicit expressions for their coeffi-
cients. Subsequently, we provide conditions under which these action updates constitute a convex
combination as in the DeGroot model, with actions converging to a consensus in the latter case. We
also investigate the efficiency of the consensus action in aggregating the initial observations of all
agents across the network. Next in Section 4, we discuss a situation where agents exchange beliefs
about a truth state that can takes one of the finitely many possibilities. The Bayesian heuristics
in this case set the updated beliefs proportional to the product of self and neighboring beliefs,
as reported in every decision epoch. We investigate the evolution of beliefs under the prescribed
update rules and compare the asymptotic beliefs with that of a Bayesian agent with direct access
to all the initial observations; thus characterizing the inefficiencies of the asymptotic beliefs. We
summarize our findings from the analysis of linear action and log-linear belief updates in Section
5, where we reiterate the assumptions that are implicit in the adoption of popular aggregation
heuristics such as the DeGroot model; moreover, we discuss the inefficiencies that arise as a result
of their application. Such heuristics allow us to aggregate the information in our environment, and
provide for desirable asymptotic properties such as consensus; however, this consensus often fails as
an efficient group aggregate for the individuals’ private data. We provide the mathematical proofs
and the relevant details for many of the results in the appendices at end of the paper.
1Simon advocates “bounded rationality” as compatible with the information access and the computational capacities
that are actually possessed by the agents in their environments. Most importantly he proposes the use of so-called
“satisficing” heuristrics; i.e. to search for alternatives that exceed some “aspiration levels” by satisfying a set of
minimal acceptability criteria [88, 89].
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2. The model. Consider a group of n agents that are labeled by [n] and interact according
to a digraph G = ([n],E).1 The neighborhood of agent i is the set of all agents whom she observes
including herself, and it is denoted by Ni = {j ∈ [n]; (j, i)∈ E}∪{i}; every node having a self-loop:
(i, i) ∈ E for all i. We refer to the cardinality of Ni as the degree of node i and denote it by
deg(i). There is a state θ ∈Θ that is unknown to the agents and it is chosen arbitrarily by nature
from an underlying state space Θ, which is measurable by a σ-finite measure Gθ(·). For example
if a space (Θ or S) is a countable set, then we can take its σ-finite measure (Gθ or Gs) to be
the counting measure, denoted by K(·); and if the space is a subset of Rk with positive Lebesgue
measure, then we can take its σ-finite measure to be the Lebesgue measure on Rk, denoted by
Λk(·). Associated with each agent i, Si is a measurable space called the signal space of i, and given
θ, Li(· | θ) is a probability measure on Si, which is referred to as the signal structure of agent i.
Furthermore, (Ω,F ,Pθ) is a probability triplet, where Ω = S1 × . . .×Sn is a product space, and
F is a properly defined sigma field over Ω. The probability measure on Ω is Pθ(·) which assigns
probabilities consistently with the signal structures Li(· | θ), i∈ [n]; and in such a way that with θ
fixed, the random variables si, i∈ [n] taking values in Si, are independent. These random variables
represent the private signals that agents i∈ [n] observe at time 0. Note that the private signals are
independent across the agents. The expectation operator Eθ{·} represents integration with respect
to Pθ(dω), ω ∈Ω.
2.1. Beliefs, actions and rewards. An agents’ belief about the unknown allows her to
make decisions even as the outcome is dependent on the unknown value θ. These beliefs about the
unknown state are probability distributions over Θ. Even before any observations are made, every
agent i∈ [n] holds a prior belief Vi(·)∈∆Θ; this represents her subjective biases about the possible
values of θ. For each time instant t, letMi,t(·) be the (random) probability distribution over Θ,
representing the opinion or belief at time t of agent i about the realized value of θ. Moreover, let
the associated expectation operator be Ei,t{·}, representing integration with respect toMi,t(dθ).
We assume that all agents share the common knowledge of signal structures Li(·|θˆ),∀θˆ ∈Θ, their
priors Vi(·), and their corresponding sample spaces Si and Θ for all i∈ [n]. 2
Let t ∈N0 denote the time index; at t= 0 the values θ ∈Θ followed by si ∈ Si of si are realized
and the latter is observed privately by each agent i for all i∈ [n]. Associated with every agent i is
an action space Ai that represents all the choices available to her at every point of time t∈N0, and
a utility ui(·, ·) :Ai×Θ→R which in expectation represents her von Neumann-Morgenstern pref-
erences regarding lotteries with independent draws from Ai and/or Θ. These utilities are additive
over time corresponding to successive independent draws. The utility functions and action spaces
are common knowledge amongst the agents. Subsequently, at every time t ∈N0 each agent i ∈ [n]
chooses an action ai,t ∈Ai and is rewarded ui(ai,t, θ).
1 Some notations: Throughout the paper, R is the set of real numbers, N denotes the set of all natural numbers,
and N0 := N ∪ {0}. For n ∈ N a fixed integer the set of integers {1,2, . . . , n} is denoted by [n], while any other set
is represented by a capital Greek or calligraphic letter. For a measurable set X we use ∆X to denote the set of all
probability distributions over the set X . Furthermore, any random variable is denoted in boldface letter, vectors are
represented in lowercase letters and with a bar over them, measures are denoted by upper case Greek or calligraphic
Latin letters, and matrices are denoted in upper case Latin letters. For a matrix A, its spectral radius ρ(A) is the
largest magnitude of all its eigenvalues.
2The signal structures Li(·|θˆ),∀θˆ ∈Θ and the priors Vi(·), as well as the corresponding sample spaces Si and Θ are
common knowledge amongst the agents for all i ∈ [n]. The assumption of common knowledge in the case of fully
rational (Bayesian) agents implies that given the same observations of one another’s beliefs or private signals distinct
agents would make identical inferences; in the sense that starting form the same belief about the unknown θ, their
updated beliefs given the same observations would be the same; in Aumann’s words, rational agents cannot agree to
disagree [5].
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2.2. Aggregation heuristics. Given si, agent i forms an initial Bayesian opinion Mi,0(·)
about the value of θ and chooses her action ai,0 ←↩ arg maxai∈Ai
∫
Θ
ui(ai, θˆ)Mi,0(dθ), maximizing
her expected reward. Here for a set A, we use the notation a←↩A to denote an arbitrary choice
from the elements of A that is assigned to a. Not being notified of the actual realized value for
ui(ai,0, θ), she then observes the actions that her neighbors have taken. Given her extended set of
observations {aj,0, j ∈Ni} at time t= 1, she refines her opinion intoMi,1(·) and makes a second,
and possibly different, move ai,1 according to:
ai,1←↩ arg max
ai∈Ai
∫
Θ
ui(ai, θ)Mi,1(dθ), (1)
maximizing her expected pay off conditional on everything that she has observed thus far; i.e.
maximizing Ei,1{ui(ai, θ)} = Eθ{ui(ai,1, θ)|si,aj,0 : j ∈ Ni} =
∫
Θ
ui(ai, θ)Mi,1(dθ). Subsequently,
she is granted her net reward of ui(ai,0, θ)+ui(ai,1, θ) from her past two plays. Following realization
of rewards for their first two plays, in any subsequent time instance t > 1 each agent i∈ [n] observes
the preceding actions of her neighbors aj,t−1 : j ∈Ni and takes an option ai,t out of the set Ai. Of
particular significance in our description of the behavior of agents in the succeeding time periods
t > 1, is the relation:
fi(aj,0 : j ∈Ni) := ai,1←↩ arg max
ai∈Ai
Ei,1{ui(ai, θ)} (2)
derived in (1), which given the observations of agent i at time t= 0, specifies her (Bayesian) pay-off
maximizing action for time t = 1. Once the format of the mapping fi(·) is obtained, it is then
used as a heuristic for decision making in every future epoch. The agents update their action
by choosing: ai,t = fi (aj,t−1 : j ∈Ni) ,∀t > 1. We refer to the mappings fi :
∏
j∈NiAj → Ai thus
obtained, as Bayesian heuristics.1,2,3
1The heuristics thus obtained suffer from same fallacies of snap judgments that are associated with the recommen-
dations of system one in “Thinking, Fast and Slow”; flawed judgments that rely on simplistic interpretations: “what
you see is all there is”, in Kahneman’s elegant words [52]. Indeed, the use of the initial Bayesian update for future
decision epochs entails a certain level of naivety on the part of the decision maker: she has to either assume that the
structure of her neighbors’ reports have not departed from their initial format, or that they are not being influenced
back by her own or other group members and can thus be regarded as independent sources of information. Such
naivety in disregarding the history of interactions has been highlighted in our earlier works on Bayesian learning
without recall [75], where we interpret the use of time-one Bayesian update for future decision epochs, as a rational
but memoryless behavior: by regarding their observations as being direct consequences of inferences that are made
based on the initial priors, the agents reject any possibility of a past history beyond their immediate observations.
2Similar and related forms of naivety have been suggested in the literature. Eyster and Rabin [26, 27] propose the
autarkic model of naive inference, where players at each generation observe their predecessors but naively think that
any predecessor’s action relies solely on that player’s private information, thus ignoring the possibility that successive
generations are learning from each other. Bala and Goyal [7]study another form of naivety and bounded-rational
behavior by considering a variation of observational learning in which agents observe the action and pay-offs of their
neighbors and make rational inferences about the action/pay-off correspondences, based on their observations of
the neighboring actions; however, they ignore the fact that their neighbors are themselves learning and trying to
maximize their own pay-offs. Levy and Razin look at a particularly relevant cognitive bias called correlation neglect,
which makes individuals regard the sources of their information as independent [60]; they analyze its implications to
diffusion of information, and focus in particular, on the voting behavior.
3Cognitive and psychological roots of the Bayesian heuristics as aggregation rules can be traced to Anderson’s seminal
theory of information integration, developed throughout 1970s and 1980s [3]. Accordingly, a so-called “value function”
assigns psychological values to each of the stimuli and these psychological values are then combined into a single
psychological (and later an observable) response through what is called the “integration function”. A fundamental
assumption is that valuation can be represented at a higher (molar) level as a value on the response dimension for each
stimulus, as well as a weight representing the salience of this stimulus in the overall response. These valuations and
weights are themselves the result of integration processes in the lower (molecular) level. At the heart of information
integration theory is the “cognitive algebra” which describes the rules by which the values and weights of stimuli are
integrated into an overall response [4].
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3. Affine action updates, linear updating and DeGroot learning. In this section we
explore the essential modeling features that lead to a linear structure in the Bayesian Heuristics.
We present a general scenario that involves the exponential family of distributions and leads to
linear action updates.
To describe the signal structures, we consider a measurable sample space S with a σ-finite
measure Gs(·), and a parametrized class of sampling functions {L(·|θ;σi)∈∆S : σi > 0 and δi > 0}
belonging to the k-dimensional exponential family as follows:
`(s|θ;σi, δi) := dL(·|θ;σi, δi)
dGs = σi
∣∣∣∣Λk(ξ(ds))Gs(ds)
∣∣∣∣ τ (σiξ(s), δi)eσiη(θ)T ξ(s)−δiγ(η(θ)), (3)
where ξ(s) : S →Rk is a measurable function acting as a sufficient statistic for the random samples,
η : Θ→Rk is a mapping from the parameter space Θ to Rk, τ : Rk ×(0,+∞)→ (0,+∞) is a positive
weighting function, and
γ(η(θ)) :=
1
δi
ln
∫
s∈S
σi
∣∣∣∣Λk(ξ(ds))Gs(ds)
∣∣∣∣ τ(σiξ(s), δi)eσiη(θ)T ξ(s)Gs(ds),
is a normalization factor that is constant when θ is fixed, even though δi > 0 and σi > 0
vary. This normalization constant for each θ is uniquely determined by the functions η(·),
ξ(·) and τ(·). The parameter space Θ and the mapping η(·) are such that the range space
Ωθ := {η(θ) : θ ∈ Θ} is an open subset of the natural parameter space Ωη := {η ∈ Rk :∫
s∈S |Λk(ξ(ds))/Gs(ds)|τ (ξ(s),1)eη
T ξ(s)Gs(ds) <∞}. In (3), σi > 0 and δi > 0 for each i are scal-
ing factors that determine the quality or informativeness of the random sample si with regard to
the unknown θ: fixing either one of the two factors σi or δi, the value of the other one increases
with the increasing informativeness of the observed value ξ(si). The following conjugate family of
priors1 are associated with the likelihood structure (3). This family is determined uniquely by the
transformation and normalization functions: η(·) and γ(·), and it is parametrized through a pair
of parameters (α,β), α∈Rk and β > 0:
Fγ,η :=
{
V(θ;α,β)∈∆Θ, α∈Rk, βi > 0 :
ν(θ;α,β) :=
dV(·;α,β)
dGθ =
∣∣∣∣Λk(η(dθ))Gθ(dθ)
∣∣∣∣ eη(θ)Tα−βγ(η(θ))κ(α,β) ,
κ(α,β) :=
∫
θ∈Θ
∣∣∣∣Λk(η(dθ))Gθ(dθ)
∣∣∣∣eη(θ)Tα−βγ(η(θ))Gθ(dθ)<∞}.
Furthermore, we assume that agents take actions in Rk, and that they aim for a minimum variance
estimation of the regression function or conditional expectation (given θ) of the sufficient statistic
ξ(si). Hence, we endow every agent i ∈ [n] with the quadratic utility ui(a, θ) = −(a−mi,θ)T (a−
mi,θ), ∀a∈Ai =Rk, where mi,θ := Ei,θ{ξ(si)} :=
∫
s∈S ξ(s)L(ds|θ;σi, δi)∈Rk.
Our main result in this section prescribes a scenario in which each agent starts from a prior
belief V(·;αi, βi) belonging to Fγ,η and she observes a fixed number ni of i.i.d. samples from the
distribution L(· | θ;σi, δi). The agents then repeatedly communicate their actions aimed at minimum
variance estimation of mi,θ. These settings are formalized under the following assumption that we
term the Exponential Family Signal-Utility Structure.
1Consider a parameter space Θ, a sample space S, and a sampling distribution L(·|θ) ∈∆S, θ ∈ Θ. Suppose that s
is a random variable which is distributed according to L(·|θ) for any θ. A family F ⊂∆Θ is a conjugate family for
L(·|θ), if starting from any prior distribution V(·) ∈ F and for any signal s ∈ S, the posterior distribution given the
observation s = s belongs to F .
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Assumption 1 (Exponential family signal-utility structure).
(i) Every agent i ∈ [n] observes ni i.i.d. private samples si,p, p ∈ [ni] from the common sample
space S and that the random samples are distributed according to the law L(·|θ;σi, δi) given
by (3) as a member of the k-dimensional exponential family.
(ii) Every agent starts from a conjugate prior Vi(·) = V(·;αi, βi)∈Fγ,η, for all i∈ [n].
(iii) Every agent chooses actions a ∈ Ai = Rk and bears the quadratic utility ui(a, θ) = −(a −
mi,θ)
T (a−mi,θ), where mi,θ := Ei,θ{ξ(si)} :=
∫
s∈S ξ(s)L(ds|θ;σi, δi)∈Rk.
The Bayesian heuristics fi(·), i ∈ [n] under the settings prescribed by the exponential family
signal-utility structure (Assumption 1) are linear functions of the neighboring actions with specified
coefficients that depend only on the likelihood structure parameters: ni, σi and δi as well as the
prior parameters: αi and βi, for all i∈ [n].1
Theorem 1 (Affine action updates). Under the exponential family signal-utility structure
specified in Assumption 1, the Bayesian heuristics describing the action update of every agent i∈ [n]
are given by: ai,t = fi(aj,t−1 : j ∈Ni) =
∑
j∈Ni Tijaj,t−1 + i, where for all i, j ∈ [n] the constants Tij
and δi are as follows:
Tij =
δiσj(nj + δ
−1
j βj)
σi(βi +
∑
p∈Ni npδp)
, i =− δi
σi(βi +
∑
p∈Ni npδp)
∑
j∈Ni\{i}
αj.
The action profile at time t is the concatenation of all actions in a column vector: at =
(aT1,t, . . . ,a
T
n,t)
T . The matrix T with entries Tij, i, j ∈ [n] given in Theorem 1 is called the social
influence matrix. The constant terms i in this theorem appear as the rational agents attempt to
compensate for the prior biases of their neighbors when making inferences about the observations
in their neighborhood; we denote  = (T1 , . . . , 
T
n )
T and refer to it as the vector of neighborhood
biases. The evolution of action profiles under conditions of Theorem 1 can be specified as follows:
at+1 = (T ⊗ Ik)at + , where Ik is the k× k identity matrix and (T ⊗ Ik) is a Kronecker product.
Subsequently, the evolution of action profiles over time follows a non-homogeneous positive linear
discrete-time dynamics, cf. [28]. If the spectral radius of T is strictly less than unity: ρ(T )< 1, then
I − T is non-singular; there is a unique equilibrium action profile given by ae = ((I − T )−1⊗ Ik) 
and limt→∞ at = ae. If unity is an eigenvalue of T , then there may be no equilibrium action profiles
or an infinity of them. If ρ(T )> 1, then the linear discrete-time dynamics is unstable and the action
profiles may grow unbounded in their magnitude, cf. [49].
Example 1 (Gaussian Signals with Gaussian Beliefs). Mossel and Tamuz [67] consider
the case where the initial private signals as well as the unknown states are normally distributed
and the agents all have full knowledge of the network structure. They show that by iteratively
observing their neighbors’ mean estimates and updating their beliefs using Bayes rule all agents
converge to the same belief. The limiting belief is the same as what a Bayesian agent with direct
access to everybody’s private signals would have hold; and furthermore, the belief updates at each
step can be computed efficiently and convergence occurs in a number of steps that is bounded
in the network size and its diameter. These results however assume complete knowledge of the
network structure by all the agents.
Here, we consider the linear action updates in the Gaussian setting. Let Θ = R be the param-
eter space associated with the unknown parameter θ ∈ Θ. Suppose that each agent i ∈ [n] holds
1Some of the non-Bayesian update rules have the property that they resemble the replication of a first step of a
Bayesian update from a common prior. For instance, DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel [21] interpret the weights in
the DeGroot model as those assigned initially by rational agents to the noisy opinions of their neighbors based on
their perceived precision. However, by repeatedly applying the same weights over and over again, the agents ignore
the need to update these weights and to account for repetitions in their information sources (the so-called persuasion
bias); as one of our main objectives, we formalize this setup as a Bayesian heuristic.
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onto a Gaussian prior belief with mean αiβ
−1
i and variance β
−1
i ; here, γ(θ) = θ
2/2 and η(θ) =
θ. Further suppose that each agent observes an independent private Gaussian signal si with
mean θ and variance σ−1i = δ
−1
i , for all i ∈ [n]; hence, ξ(si) = si and τ(σiξ(si), δi) = τ(σisi, σi) =
(2pi/σi)
−1/2
exp(σis
2
i /2). After observing their private signals all engage in repeated communica-
tions with their neighbors. Finally, we assume that each agents is trying to estimate the mean
mi,θ = Ei,θ{si} of her private signal with as little variance as possible. Under the prescribed set-
ting, Theorem 1 applies and the Bayesian heuristic update rules are affine with the coefficients as
specified in the theorem with ni = 1 and σi = δi for all i. In particular, if αi = (0, . . . ,0) ∈Rk and
βi→ 0 for all i, then i = 0 for all i and the coefficients Tij = σj/
∑
p∈Ni σp > 0 specify a convex
combination:
∑
j∈Ni Tij = 1 for all i.
Example 2 (Poisson signals with gamma beliefs). As the second example, suppose that
each agent observe ni i.i.d. Poisson signals si,p : p ∈ [ni] with mean δiθ, so that Θ =Ai = (0,+∞)
for all i ∈ [n]. Moreover, we take each agent’s prior to be a Gamma distribution with parameters
αi > 0 and βi > 0, denoted Gamma(αi,βi):
νi(θ) :=
dVi
dΛ1
=
βi
αi
Γ(αi)
θαi−1e−βiθ,
for all θ ∈ (0,∞) and each i ∈ [n]. Note that here η(θ) = log θ, γ(η(θ)) = exp(η(θ)) = θ, κ(αi, βi) =
Γ(αi)βi
−αi , mi,θ = δiθ, ξ(si,p) = si,p, σi = 1 and τ(σiξ(si,p), δi) = δ
si,p
i /(si,p!), for all i, p. This setting
corresponds also to a case of Poisson observers with common rate θ and individual exposures
δi, i∈ [n], cf. [33, p. 54]. The posterior distribution over Θ after observing of the sum of ni Poisson
mean δiθ samples is again a Gamma distribution with updated (random) parameters
∑ni
p=1 si,p+αi
and niδi+βi, [33, pp. 52–53]. Using a quadratic utility −(a−δiθ)2, the expected pay-off at time zero
is maximized by the δi-scaled mean of the posterior Gamma belief distribution [33, p. 587]: ai,0 =
δi(
∑ni
p=1 si,p +αi)/(niδi +βi). Given the neighboring information
∑nj
p=1 sj,p = (nj +βjδ
−1
j )aj,0−αj,
∀j ∈Ni, agent i can refine her belief into a Gamma distribution with parameters αi +
∑
j∈Ni [(nj +
βjδ
−1
j )aj,0 − αj] and βi +
∑
j∈Ni njδj. The subsequent optimal action at time 1 and the resultant
Bayesian heuristics are as claimed in Theorem 1 with σi = 1 for all i∈ [n]. Here if we let αi, βi→ 0
and δi = δ > 0 for all i, then i = 0 for all i and the coefficients Tij = nj/
∑
p∈Ni np > 0 again
specify a convex combination:
∑
j∈Ni Tij = 1 for all i as in the DeGroot model. In the following
two subsections, we shall further explore this correspondence with the DeGroot updates and the
implied asymptotic consensus amongst the agents.
3.1. Linear updating and convergence. In general, the constant terms i in Theorem 1
depend on the neighboring prior parameters αj, j ∈ Ni \ {i} and can be non-zero. Accumulation
of constant terms over time when ρ(T ) ≥ 1 prevents the action profiles from converging to any
finite values or may cause them to oscillate indefinitely (depending upon the model parameters).
However, if the prior parameters are vanishingly small, then the affine action updates in Theorem
1 reduce to linear update and i = 0. This requirement on the prior parameters is captured by our
next assumption.
Assumption 2 (Non-informative priors). For a member V(·;α,β) of the conjugate family
Fγ,η we denote the limit limαi,βi→0 V(·;α,β) by V∅(·) and refer to it as the non-informative (and
improper, if V∅(·) 6∈ Fγ,η) prior. 1 All agents start from a common non-informative prior: Vi(·) =
V∅(·), ∀i.
1Conjugate priors offer a technique for deriving the prior distributions based on the sample distribution (likelihood
structures). However, in lack of any prior information it is impossible to justify their application on any subjective
basis or to determine their associated parameters for any agent. Subsequently, the use of non-informative priors is
suggested by Bayesian analysts and various techniques for selecting non-informative priors is explored in the literature
[55]. Amongst the many proposed techniques for selecting non-informative priors, Jeffery’s method sets its choice
Rahimian and Jadbabaie: Bayesian Heuristics for Group Decisions
10
As the name suggest non-informative priors do not inform the agent’s action at time 0 and
the optimal action is completely determined by the observed signal si,p : p∈ [ni] and its likelihood
structure, parameterized by σi and δi. If we let αi, βi→ 0 in the expressions of Tij and i from
Theorem1, then the affine action updates reduce to linear combinations and the preceding corollary
is immediate.
Corollary 1 (Linear updating). Under the exponential family signal-utility structure
(Assumption 1) with non-informative priors (Assumption 2); the Bayesian heuristics describe
each updated action ai,t as a linear combination of the neighboring actions aj,t−1, j ∈ Ni: ai,t =∑
j∈Ni Tijaj,t−1, where Tij = δiσjnj/(σi
∑
p∈Ni npδp).
The action profiles under Corollary 1 evolve as a homogeneous positive linear discrete-time system:
at+1 = (T ⊗Ik)at and if the spectral radius of T is strictly less than unity, then limt→∞ at = 0. For a
strongly connected social network with Tii > 0 for all i the Perron-Frobenius theory [85, Theorems
1.5 and 1.7] implies that T has a simple positive real eigenvalue equal to ρ(T ). Moreover, the
left and right eigenspaces associated with ρ(T ) are both one-dimensional with the corresponding
eigenvectors l= (l1, . . . , ln)
T and r= (r1, . . . , rn)
T , uniquely satisfying ‖l‖2 = ‖r‖2 = 1, li > 0, ri > 0,
∀i and ∑ni=1 liri = 1. The magnitude of any other eigenvalue of T is strictly less than ρ(T ). If
ρ(T ) = 1, then limt→∞ at = limt→∞(T t⊗ Ik)a0 = (rlT ⊗ Ik) a0; in particular, the asymptotic action
profile may not represent a consensus although every action converges to some point within the
convex hull of the initial actions {ai,0, i∈ [n]}. If ρ(T )> 1, then the linear discrete-time dynamics
is unstable and the action profiles may increase or decrease without bound; pushing the decision
outcome to extremes, we can associate ρ(T )> 1 to cases of polarizing group interactions.
3.2. DeGroot updates, consensus and efficiency. In order for the linear action updates
in Corollary 1 to constitute a convex combination as in the DeGroot model,1 we need to introduce
some additional restrictions on the likelihood structure of the private signals.
Assumption 3 (Locally balanced likelihoods). The likelihood structures given in (3) are
called locally balanced if for all i∈ [n], (δi/σi) = (
∑
j∈Ni δjnj) /
∑
j∈Ni σjnj.
Assumption 3 signifies a local balance property for the two exponential family parameters σi
and δi and across every neighborhood in the network. In particular, we need for the likelihood
structures of every agent i and her neighborhood to satisfy: δi
∑
j∈Ni σjnj = σi
∑
j∈Ni δjnj. Since
parameters σi and δi are both measures of accuracy or precision for private signals of agent i,
the balance condition in Assumption 3 imply that the signal precisions are spread evenly over the
agents; i.e. the quality of observations obey a rule of social balance such that no agent is in a
proportional to the square root of Fisher’s information measure of the likelihood structure [81, Section 3.5.3], while
Laplace’s classical principle of insufficient reason favors equiprobability leading to priors which are uniform over the
parameter space.
1The use of linear averaging rules for modeling opinion dynamics has a long history in mathematical sociology and
social psychology [30]; their origins can be traced to French’s seminal work on“A Formal Theory of Social Power”
[29]. This was followed up by Harary’s investigation of the mathematical properties of the averaging model, including
the consensus criteria, and its relations to Markov chain theory [41]. This model was later generalized to belief
exchange dynamics and popularized by DeGroot’s seminal work [20] on linear opinion pools. In engineering literature,
the possibility to achieve consensus in a distributed fashion (through local interactions and information exchanges
between neighbors) is very desirable in a variety of applications such as load balancing [6], distributed detection and
estimation [15, 95, 54], tracking [56], sensor networks and data fusion [98, 99], as well as distributed control and
robotics networks [46, 64]. Early works on development of consensus algorithms originated in 1980s with the works
of Tsitsiklis et.al [94] who propose a weighted average protocol based on a linear iterative approach for achieving
consensus: each node repeatedly updates its value as a weighted linear combination of its own value and those received
by its neighbors.
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position of superiority to everyone else. Indeed, fixing δi = δ for all i, the latter condition reduces
to a harmonic property for the parameters σi, when viewed as a function of their respective nodes
(cf. [61, Section 2.1] for the definition and properties of harmonic functions):
σi =
∑
j∈Ni
njσj∑
k∈Ni nk
, δi = δ,∀i. (4)
However, in a strongly conceded social network (4) cannot hold true unless σi is a constant: σi = σ
for all i. Similarly, when σi = σ is a constant, then under Assumption 3 δi is spread as a harmonic
function over the network nodes, and therefore can only take a constant value δi = δ for all i, cf.
[61, Section 2.1, Maximum Principle]. In particular, fixing either of the parameters σi or δi for all
agents and under the local balance condition in Assumption 3, it follows that the other parameter
should be also fixed across the network; hence, the ratio σi/δi will be a constant for all i. Later
when we consider the efficiency of consensus action we introduce a strengthening of Assumption 3,
called globally balanced likelihood (cf. Assumption 4), where the ratio δi/σi should be a constant
for all agents across the network. Examples 1 and 2 above provide two scenarios in which the
preceding balancedness conditions may be satisfied: (i) having σi = δi for all i, as was the case
with the Gaussian signals in Example 1, erasures that the likelihoods are globally balanced; (ii)
all agents receiving i.i.d. signals from a common distribution in Examples 2 (Poisson signals with
the common rate θ and common exposure δ) makes a case for likelihoods being locally balanced.
Theorem 2 (DeGroot updating and consensus). Under the exponential family signal-
utility structure (Assumption 1), with non-informative priors (Assumption 2) and locally balanced
likelihoods (Assumption 3); the updated action ai,t is a convex combination of the neighboring
actions aj,t−1, j ∈Ni: ai,t =
∑
j∈Ni Tijaj,t−1,
∑
j∈Ni Tij = 1 for all i. Hence, in a strongly connected
social network the action profiles converge to a consensus, and the consensus value is a convex
combination of the initial actions ai,0 : i∈ [n].
In light of Theorem 2, it is of interest to know if the consensus action agrees with the min-
imum variance unbiased estimator of mi,θ given all the observations of every agent across the
network, i.e. whether the Bayesian heuristics efficiently aggregate all the information amongst the
networked agents. Our next result addresses this question. For that to hold we need to introduce
a strengthening of Assumption 3:
Assumption 4 (Globally balanced likelihoods). The likelihood structures given in (3) are
called globally balanced if for all i∈ [n] and some common constant C > 0, δi/σi =C.
In particular, under Assumption 4, σiδj = σjδi for all i, j, and it follows that the local balance
of likelihoods is automatically satisfied. We call the consensus action efficient if it coincides with
the minimum variance unbiased estimator of mi,θ for all i and given all the observations of every
agent across the network. Our next result indicates that global balance is a necessary condition
for the agents to reach consensus on a globally optimal (efficient) action. To proceed, let the
network graph structure be encoded by its adjacency matrix A defined as [A]ij = 1 ⇐⇒ (j, i)∈ E ,
and [A]ij = 0 otherwise. To express the conditions for efficiency of consensus, we need to consider
the set of all agents who listen to the beliefs of a given agent j; we denote this set of agents by
N outj := {i ∈ [n] : [I +A]ij = 1} and refer to them as the out-neighborhood of agent j. This is in
contrast to her neighborhood Nj, which is the set of all agents whom she listens to. Both sets Nj
and N outj include agent j as a member.
Theorem 3 ((In-)Efficiency of consensus). Under the exponential family signal-utility
structure (Assumption 1) and with non-informative priors (Assumption 2); in a strongly connected
social network the agents achieve consensus at an efficient action if, and only if, the likelihoods are
globally balanced and
∑
p∈Noutj
npδp =
∑
p∈Ni npδp, for all i and j. The efficient consensus action is
then given by a? =
∑n
j=1
(
δjnjaj,0/
∑n
p=1 npδp
)
.
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Following our discussing of Assumption 3 and equation (4), we pointed out that if either of
the two parameters σi and δi that characterize the exponential family distribution of (3) are held
fixed amongst the agents, then the harmonicity condition required for the local balancedness of
the likelihoods implies that the other parameter is also fixed for all the agents. Therefore the local
balancedness in many familiar cases (see Example 2) restricts the agents to observing i.i.d. signals:
allowing heterogeneity only in the sample sizes, but not in the distribution of each sample. This
special case is treated in our next corollary, where we also provide the simpler forms of the Bayesian
heuristics and their linearity coefficients in the i.i.d. case:
Corollary 2 (DeGroot learning with i.i.d. samples). Suppose that each agent i ∈ [n]
observes ni i.i.d. samples belonging to the same exponential family signal-utility structure (Assump-
tion 1 with σi = σ and δi = δ for all i). If the agents have non-informative priors (Assump-
tion 2) and the social network is strongly connected social network, then following the Bayesian
heuristics agents update their action according to the linear combination: ai,t =
∑
j∈Ni Tijaj,t−1,
where Tij = nj/
∑
p∈Ni np, and reach a consensus. The consensus action is efficient if, and only
if,
∑
p∈Noutj
np =
∑
p∈Ni np for all i and j, and the efficient consensus action is given by a
? =∑n
j=1
(
aj,0nj/
∑n
p=1 np
)
.
It is notable that the consensus value pinpointed by Theorem 2 does not necessarily agree with
the MVUE of mi,θ given all the private signals of all agents across the network; in other words,
by following Bayesian heuristics agents may not aggregate all the initial data efficiently. As a
simple example, consider the exponential family signal-utility structure with non-informative priors
(Assumptions 1 and 2) and suppose that every agent observes an i.i.d. sample from a common
distribution L(·|θ; 1,1). In this case, the action updates proceed by simple iterative averaging:
ai,t = (1/|Ni|)
∑
j∈Ni aj,t−1 for all i∈ [n] and any t∈N. For an undirected graph G it is well-known
that the asymptotic consensus action following simple iterative averaging is the degree-weighted
average
∑n
i=1(deg(i)/|E|)ai,0, cf. [38, Section II.C]; and the consensus action is different form the
global MVUE a? = (1/n)
∑n
i=1 ai,0 unless the social network is a regular graph in which case,
deg(i) = d is fixed for all i, and |E|= n.d.
Remark 1 (Efficiency of Balanced Regular Structures). In general, if we assume
that all agents receive the same number of i.i.d. samples from the same distribution, then the condi-
tion for efficiency of consensus,
∑
p∈Noutj
np =
∑
p∈Ni np, is satisfied for balanced regular structures.
In such highly symmetric structures, the number of outgoing and incoming links are the same for
every node and equal to fixed number d.
Our results shed light on the deviations from the globally efficient actions, when consensus is
being achieved through the Bayesian heuristics. This inefficiency of Bayesian heuristics in globally
aggregating the observations can be attributed to the agents’ naivety in inferring the sources of
their information, and their inability to interpret the actions of their neighbors rationally, [38];
in particular, the more central agents tend to influence the asymptotic outcomes unfairly. This
sensitivity to social structure is also due to the failure of agents to correct for the repetitions in
the sources of the their information: agent i may receive multiple copies that are all influenced by
the same observations from a far way agent; however, she fails to correct for these repetition in the
sources of her observations, leading to the co-called persuasion bias, [21].1
1Sobel [90] provides a theoretical framework to study the interplay between rationality and group decisions and points
out the subsequent inefficiencies in information aggregation. The seminal work of Janis [50] provides various examples
involving the American foreign policy in the mid-twentieth where the desire for harmony or conformity in the group
have resulted in bad group decisions, a phenomenon that he coins groupthink. Various other works have looked at the
choice shift toward more extreme options [23, 91] and group polarization [44, 83].
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4. Log-Linear belief updates. When the state space Θ is finite, the action space is the
probability simplex and the agents bear a quadratic utility that measures the distance between
their action and the point mass on the true state, the communication structure between the agents
is rich enough for them to reveal their beliefs at every time period. The Bayesian heuristics in
this case lead to a log-linear updating of beliefs similar to what we analyze in [73, 75] under the
Bayesian without recall model; the chief question of interest to the latter works is whether the
agents, after being exposed to sequence of private observations and while communicating with each
other, can learn the truth using the Bayesian without recall update rules. 1 The learning framework
of [73, 74, 75, 78] in which agents have access to an stream of new observations is in contrast with
the group decision model of this paper; the difference being in the fact that here the agents have a
single initial observation and engage in group decision making to come up with the best decision
that aggregates their individual private data with those of the other group members.
Consider an environment where the state space is a finite set of cardinality m and agents take
actions over the (m−1)-simplex of probability measures while trying to minimize their distance to
a point mass on the true state. Specifically, let Θ = {θ1, . . . , θm}, Ai = ∆Θ and for any probability
measure M(·)∈Ai with probability mass function µ(·) := dM/dK, suppose that
ui(M, θj) =−(1−µ(θj))2−
m∑
k=1,
k 6=j
µ(θk)
2.
Subsequently,Mi,t = arg maxM∈∆Θ Ei,t{ui(M, θ)}, and the agents proceed by truthfully announc-
ing their beliefs to each other at every time step. In particular, if we denote the belief probability
mass functions νi(·) := dVi/dK and µi,t(·) := dMi,t/dK for all t, then we can follow the steps of [77]
to derive the Bayesian heuristic fi in (2) by replicating the time-one Bayesian belief update for all
future time-steps:
µi,t(θˆ) =
µi,t−1(θˆ)
(∏
j∈Ni\{i}
µj,t−1(θˆ)
νj(θˆ)
)
∑
θ˜∈Θµi,t−1(θ˜)
(∏
j∈Ni\{i}
µj,t−1(θ˜)
νj(θ˜)
) , (5)
for all θˆ ∈Θ and at any t > 1.2,3
1Naivety of agents in these cases impedes their ability to learn; except in simple social structures such as cycles or
rooted trees (cf. [74]). Rahimian, Shahrampour and Jadbabaie [78] show that learning in social network with complex
neighborhood structures can be achieved if agents choose a neighbor randomly at every round and restrict their belief
update to the selected neighbor each time. In the literature on theory of learning in games [31], log-linear learning
refers to a class of randomized strategies, where the probability of each action is proportional to an exponential of the
difference between the utility of taking that action and the utility of the optimal choice. Such randomized strategies
combine in a log-linear manner [14], and they have desirable convergence properties: under proper conditions, it can
be shown that the limiting (stationary) distribution of action profiles is supported over the Nash equilibria of the
game [62].
2In writing (5), every time agent i regards each of her neighbors j ∈ Ni as having started from some prior belief
νj(·) and arrived at their currently reported belief µj,t−1(·) upon observing their private signals, hence rejecting any
possibility of a past history, or learning and correlation between their neighbors. Such a rule is of course not the
optimum Bayesian update of agent i at any step t > 1, because the agent is not taking into account the complete
observed history of beliefs and is instead, basing her inference entirely on the initial signals and the immediately
observed beliefs.
3It is notable that the Bayesian heuristic in (5) has a log-linear structure. Geometric averaging and logarithmic opinion
pools have a long history in Bayesian analysis and behavioral decision models [37, 84] and they can be also justified
under specific behavioral assumptions [65]. The are also quite popular as a non-Bayesian update rule in engineering
literature for addressing problems such as distributed detection and estimation [86, 79, 71, 59, 8]. In [8] the authors use
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4.1. An algebra of beliefs. Both the linear action updates studied in the previous chapter
as well as the weighted majority update rules that arise in the binary case and are studied in
[76, 75] have a familiar algebraic structure. It is instructive to develop similar structural properties
for belief updates in (5) and over the space ∆Θ, i.e. the points of the standard (m− 1)-simplex.
Given two beliefs µ1(·) and µ2(·) over Θ we denote their “addition” as
µ1⊕µ2(θˆ) = µ1(θˆ)µ2(θˆ)∑
θˆ∈Θ µ1(θˆ)µ2(θˆ)
.
Indeed, let ∆Θo denote the (m− 1)-simplex of probability measure over Θ after all the edges are
excluded; ∆Θo endowed with the ⊕ operation, constitutes a group (in the algebraic sense of the
word). It is easy to verify that the uniform distribution µ¯(θˆ) = 1/|Θ| acts as the identity element
for the group; in the sense that µ¯⊕µ= µ for all µ ∈∆Θo, and given any such µ we can uniquely
identify its inverse as follows:
µinv(θˆ) =
1/µ(θˆ)∑
θ˜∈Θ 1/µ(θ˜)
.
Moreover, the group operation⊕ is commutative and we can thus endow the abelian group (∆Θo,⊕)
with a subtraction operation:
µ1	µ2(θˆ) = µ1⊕µinv2 (θˆ) =
µ1(θˆ)/µ2(θˆ)∑
θ˜∈Θ µ1(θ˜)/µ2(θ˜)
.
We are now in a position to rewrite the Bayesian heuristic for belief updates in terms of the group
operations ⊕ and 	 over the simplex interior:
µi,t = ⊕
j∈Ni
µj,t−1 	
j∈Ni\{i}
νj.
The above belief update has a structure similar to the linear action updates studied in (1): the
agents incorporate the beliefs of their neighbors while compensating for the neighboring priors to
isolate the observational parts of the neighbors’ reports. A key difference between the action and
belief updates is in the fact that action updates studied in Section 3 are weighted in accordance
with the observational ability of each neighbor, whereas the belief updates are not. Indeed, the
quality of signals are already internalized in the reported beliefs of each neighbor; therefore there
is no need to re-weight the reported beliefs when aggregating them.
a logarithmic opinion pool to combine the estimated posterior probability distributions in a Bayesian consensus filter;
and show that as a result: the sum of KullbackLeibler divergences between the consensual probability distribution
and the local posterior probability distributions is minimized. Minimizing the sum of KullbackLeibler divergences as
a way to globally aggregate locally measured probability distributions is proposed in [11, 10] where the corresponding
minimizer is dubbed the KullbackLeibler average. Similar interpretations of the log-linear update are offered in [70]
as a gradient step for minimizing either the KullbackLeibler distance to the true distribution, or in [72] as a posterior
incorporation of the most recent observations, such that the sum of KullbackLeibler distance to the local priors is
minimized; indeed, the Bayes’ rule itself has a product form and the Bayesian posterior can be characterized as the
solution of an optimization problem involving the KullbackLeibler divergence to the prior distribution and subjected
to the observed data [100]. In the past, we have investigated the implications of such log-linear behavior and properties
of convergence and learning when agents are exposed to a stream of private observation [73, 74, 77, 78].
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Given the abelian group structure we can further consider the “powers” of each element µ2 =
µ⊕µ and so on; in general for each inetger n and any belief µ ∈∆Θo, let the n-th power of µ be
denoted by nµ := µn, defined as follows:1
µn(θˆ) =
µn(θˆ)∑
θ˜∈Θ µ
n(θ˜)
.
Using the ⊕ and  notations, as well as the adjacency matrix A we get:
µi,t+1 = ⊕
j∈Ni
µj,t 	
j∈Ni\{i}
νj = ⊕
j∈[n]
([I +A]ij µj,t) 	
j∈[n]
([A]ij  νj). (9)
With some abuse of notation, we can concatenate the network beliefs at every time t into a column
vector µt = (µ1,t, . . . ,µn,t)
T and similarly for the priors ν = (ν1, . . . , νn)
T ; thus (9) can be written
in the vectorized format by using the matrix notation as follows:
µt = {(I +A)µt−1}	{A ν} (10)
Iterating over t and in the common matrix notation we obtain:
µt =
{
(I +A)tµ0
}
	
{
(
∑t
τ=0(I +A)
τA) ν
}
. (11)
The above is key to understanding the evolution of beliefs under the Bayesian heuristics in (5), as
we will explore next. In particular, when all agents have uniform priors νj = µ¯ for all j, then (10)
and (11) simplify as follows: µt = (I +A)µt−1 = (I +A)t µ0. This assumption of a common
uniform prior is the counterpart of Assumption 1 (non-informative priors) in Subsection 3.1, which
paved the way for transition from affine action updates into linear ones. In the case of beliefs over
a finite state space Θ, the uniform prior µ¯ is non-informative. If all agents start form common
uniform priors, the belief update in (5) simplifies as follows:
µi,t(θˆ) =
∏
j∈Ni µj,t−1(θˆ)∑
θ˜∈Θ
∏
j∈Ni µj,t−1(θ˜)
. (12)
Our main focus in the next section is to understand how the individual beliefs evolve under (5),
or (12) which is a spacial case of (5). The gist of our analysis is encapsulated in the group theoretic
iterations: µt = (I +A)
t  µ0, derived above for the common uniform priors case. In particular,
our understanding of the increasing matrix powers (I +A)t plays a key role. When the network
graph G is strongly connected, the matrix I +A is primitive. The Perron-Frobenius theory [85,
Theorems 1.5 and 1.7] implies that I+A has a simple positive real eigenvalue equal to its spectral
radius ρ(I +A) = 1 + ρ, where we adopt the shorthand notation ρ := ρ(A). Moreover, the left and
right eigenspaces associated with this eigenvalue are both one-dimensional and the corresponding
eigenvectors can be taken such that they both have strictly positive entries. The magnitude of
any other eigenvalue of I +A is strictly less than 1 + ρ. Hence, the eigenvalues of I +A denoted
by λi(I +A), i ∈ [n], can be ordered in their magnitudes as follows: |λn(I +A)| ≤ |λn−1(I +A)| ≤
1This notation extends to all real numbers n∈R, and it is easy to verify that the following distributive properties are
satisfied:
n (µ1⊕µ2) = (nµ1)⊕ (nµ2),
(m+n)µ1 = (mµ1)⊕ (nµ1),
(m.n)µ1 =m (nµ1),
for all m,n∈R and µ1, µ2 ∈∆Θo.
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. . . < λ1(I+A) = 1 +ρ. Subsequently, we can employ the eigendecomposition of (I+A) to analyze
the behavior of (I +A)t+1. Specifically, we can take a set of bi-orthonormal vectors li, ri as the
left and right eigenvectors corresponding to the ith eigenvalue of I +A, satisfying: ‖li‖2 = ‖ri‖2
= 1, l
T
i ri = 1 for all i and l
T
i rj = 0, i 6= j; in particular, the left eigenspace associated with ρ is
one-dimensional with the corresponding eigenvector l1 = α = (α1, . . . , αn)
T , uniquely satisfying∑n
i=1αi = 1, αi > 0, ∀i∈ [n], and αTA= (ρ+ 1)αT . The entry αi is called the centrality of agent i
and as the name suggests, it measures how central is the location of agent in the network. We can
now use the spectral representation of A to write [49, Section 6]:
(I +A)t = (1 + ρ)t
(
r1α
T
+
n∑
i=2
(λi(I +A)/(1 + ρ))
tril
T
i
)
. (13)
Asymptotically, we get that all eigenvalues other than the Perron-Frobenius eigenvalue 1 + ρ are
subdominant; hence, (I+A)t→ (1 +ρ)tr1αT and µt = (1 +ρ)tr1αT µ0 as t→∞; the latter holds
true for the common uniform priors case and also in general, as we shall see next.
4.2. Becoming certain about the group aggregate. We begin our investigation of the
evolution of beliefs under (12) by considering the optimal response (belief) of an agents who has
been given access to the set of all private observations across the network; indeed, such a response
can be achieved in practice if one follows Kahneman’s advice and collect each individual’s infor-
mation privately before combining them or allowing the individuals to engage in public discussions
[52, Chapter 23]. Starting from the uniform prior and after observing everybody’s private data our
aggregate belief about the truth state is given by the following implementation of the Bayes rule:
µ?(θˆ) =
∏
j∈Ni `j(sj|θˆ)∑
θ˜∈Θ
∏
j∈Ni `j(sj|θ˜)
. (14)
Our next theorem describes the asymptotic outcome of the group decision process when the agents
report their beliefs and follow the Bayesian heuristic (12) to aggregate them. The outcome indi-
cated in Theorem 4 departs from the global optimum µ? in two major respects. Firstly, the
agents reach consensus on a belief that is supported over Θ♦ := arg maxθ˜∈Θ
∑n
i=1αi log(`i(si|θ˜)),
as opposed to the global (network-wide) likelihood maximizer Θ? := arg maxθ˜∈Θ µ
?(θ˜) =
arg maxθ˜∈Θ
∑n
i=1 log(`i(si|θ˜)); note that the signal log-likelihoods in the case of Θ♦ are weighted
by the centralities, αi, of their respective nodes. Secondly, the consensus belief is concentrated
uniformly over Θ♦, its support does not include the entire state space Θ and those states which
score lower on the centrality-weighted likelihood scale are asymptotically rejected as a candidate
for the truth state; in particular, if {θ♦} = Θ♦ is a singlton, then the agents effectively become
certain about the truth state of θ♦, in spite of their essentially bounded aggregate information and
in contrast with the rational (optimal) belief µ? that is given by the Bayes rule in (14) and do not
discredit or reject any of the less probable states. This unwarranted certainty in the face of limited
aggregate data is a manifestation of the group polarization effect that derive the agent to more
extreme beliefs, rejecting the possibility of any alternatives outside of Θ♦.
Theorem 4 (Certainty about the group aggregate). Following the Bayesian heuristic
belief updates in (5), limt→∞µi,t(θ˜) = 1/|Θ♦| for all i ∈ [n] and any θ˜ ∈ Θ?, where Θ♦ :=
arg maxθ˜∈Θ
∑n
i=1αi log(`i(si|θ˜)). In particular, if the sum of signal log-likelihoods weighted by node
centralities is uniquely maximized by θ♦, i.e. {θ♦}= Θ♦, then limt→∞µi,t(θ♦) = 1 almost surely for
all i∈ [n].
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Remark 2 (Efficiency of balanced regular networks). The fact that log-likelihoods
in Θ♦ are weighted by the node centralities is a source of inefficiency for the asymptotic outcome of
the group decision process. This inefficiency is warded off in especially symmetric typologies, where
in and out degrees of all nodes in the network are the same. In these so-called balanced regular
digraphs, there is a fixed integer d such that all agents receive reports from exactly d agents, and
also send their reports to some other d agents; d-regular graphs are a special case, since all links
are bidirectional and each agent sends her reports to and receive reports from the same d agents.
In such structures α= (1/n)1 so that Θ? = Θ♦ and the support of the consensus belief identifies
the global maximum likelihood estimator (MLE); i.e. the maximum likelihood estimator of the
unknown θ, given the entire set of observations from all agents in the network.
5. Conclusions. We propose the Bayesian heuristics framework to address the problem of
information aggregation and decision making in groups. Our model is consistent with the dual
process theory of mind with one system developing the heuristics through deliberation and slow
processing, and another system adopting the heuristics for fast and automatic decision making:
once the time-one Bayesian update is developed, it is used as a heuristic for all future decision
epochs. On the one hand, this model offers a behavioral foundation for non-Bayesian updating; in
particular, linear action updates and log-linear belief updates. On the other hand, its deviation from
the rational choice theory captures common fallacies of snap-judgments and history neglect that
are observed in real life. Our behavioral method also complements the axiomatic approaches which
investigate the structure of belief aggregation rules and require them to satisfy specific axioms such
as label neutrality and imperfect recall, as well as independence or separability for log-linear and
linear rules, respectively [65].
We showed that under a natural quadratic utility and for a wide class of distributions from the
exponential family the Bayesian heuristics correspond to a minimum variance Bayes estimation
with a known linear structure. If the agents have non-informative priors, and their signal structures
satisfy certain homogeneity conditions, then these action updates constitute a convex combination
as in the DeGroot model, where agents reach consensus on a point in the convex hull of their
initial actions. In case of belief updates (when agents communicate their beliefs), we showed that
the agents update their beliefs proportionally to the product of the self and neighboring beliefs.
Subsequently, their beliefs converge to a consensus supported over a maximum likelihood set, where
the signal likelihoods are weighted by the centralities of their respective agents.
Our results indicate certain deviations from the globally efficient outcomes, when consensus is
being achieved through the Bayesian heuristics. This inefficiency of Bayesian heuristics in globally
aggregating the observations is attributed to the agents’ naivety in inferring the sources of their
information, which makes them vulnerable to structural network influences: the share of centrally
located agents in shaping the asymptotic outcome is more than what is warranted by the quality
of their data. Another source of inefficiency is in the group polarization that arise as a result of
repeated group interactions; in case of belief updates, this is manifested in the structure of the
(asymptotic) consensus beliefs. The latter assigns zero probability to any alternative that scores
lower than the maximum in the weighted likelihoods scale: the agents reject the possibility of less
probable alternatives with certainty, in spite of their limited initial data. This overconfidence in
the group aggregate and shift toward more extreme beliefs is a key indicator of group polarization
and is demonstrated very well by the asymptotic outcome of the group decision process.
We pinpoint some key differences between the action and belief updates (linear and log-linear,
respectively): the former are weighted updates, whereas the latter are unweighted symmetric
updates. Accordingly, an agent weighs each neighbor’s action differently and in accordance with
the quality of their private signals (which are inferred from the actions). On the other hand, when
communicating their beliefs the quality of each neighbor’s signal is already internalized in their
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reported beliefs; hence, when incorporating her neighboring beliefs, an agent regards the reported
beliefs of all her neighbors equally and symmetrically. Moreover, in the case of linear action updates
the initial biases are amplified and accumulated in every iteration. Hence, the interactions of biased
agents are very much dominated by their prior beliefs rather than their observations. This issue can
push their choices to extremes, depending on the aggregate value of their initial biases. Therefore, if
the Bayesian heuristics are to aggregate information from the observed actions satisfactorily, then
it is necessary for the agents to be unbiased, i.e. they should hold non-informative priors about the
state of the world and base their actions entirely on their observations. In contrast, when agents
exchange beliefs with each other the multiplicative belief update can aggregate the observations,
irrespective of the prior beliefs. The latter are asymptotically canceled; hence, multiplicative belief
updates are robust to the influence of priors.
The Bayesian heuristics approach is strongly motivated by the behavioral processes that underlie
human decision making. These processes often deviate from the predictions of the rational choice
theory, and our investigation of the Bayesian heuristics highlights both the mechanisms for such
deviations and their ramifications. In our ongoing research, we expand this behavioral approach by
incorporating additional cognitive biases such as inattentiveness, and investigate how the decision
processes are affected. On the one hand, the obtained insights highlight the value of educating
the public about benefits of rational decision making and unbiased judgment, and how to avoid
common cognitive errors when making decisions. On the other hand, by investigating the effect of
cognitive biases, we can improve the practice of social and organizational policies, such that new
designs can accommodate commonly observed biases, and work well in spite of them.
Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 1. If agent i starts from a prior belief Vi(·) = V(·;αi, βi)∈
Fγ,η, then we can use the Bayes rule to verify that, cf. [81, Proposition 3.3.13], the Radon-Nikodym
derivative of the Bayesian posterior of agent i after observing ni samples si,p ∈ S, p ∈ [ni], with
likelihood (3) is ν(·;αi +σi
∑ni
p=1 ξ(si,p), βi +niδi), and in particular the Bayesian posterior at time
zero belongs to the conjugate family Fγ,η:Mi,0(·) = V(·;αi +σi
∑ni
p=1 ξ(si,p), βi +niδi).
Subject to the quadratic utility ui(a, θ) = −(a−mi,θ)T (a−mi,θ), the expected pay-off at any
time time t is maximized is by choosing [12, Lemma 1.4.1]:
ai,t =Ei,t{mi,θ} :=
∫
θ∈Θ
mi,θMi,t(dθ),
which coincides with her minimum variance unbiased estimator (Bayes estimate) for mi,θ. The
members of the conjugate family Fγ,η satisfy the following linearity property of the Bayes estimates
that is key to our derivations.1
Lemma 1 (Proposition 3.3.14 of [81]). Let ζ ∈ Rk be a parameter and suppose that the
parameter space Ωζ is an open set in Rk. Suppose further that ζ ∈ Ωζ has the prior distribution
W(·;α,β) with density κ′(α,β)eζTα−βγ(ζ) w.r.t. Λk where κ′(α,β) is the normalization constant. If
s′ ∈ S ′ ⊂Rk is a random signal with distribution D(·; ζ) and density τ ′(s)eζts−γ′(ζ) w.r.t. Λk, then∫
ζ∈Ωζ
∫
s′∈S′
sD(ds; ζ)W(dζ;α,β) = α
β
.
1In fact, such an affine mapping from the observations to the Bayes estimate characterizes the conjugate family Fγ,η
and every member of this family can be uniquely identified from the constants of the affine transform [22].
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Hence for any V(·;α,β) ∈ Fγ,η we can write∫
θ∈Θ
mi,θV(dθ;α,β) =
∫
θ∈Θ
∫
s∈S
ξ(s)L(ds|θ;σ, δ)V(dθ;α,β)
=
∫
θ∈Θ
∣∣∣∣Λk(η(dθ))Gθ(dθ)
∣∣∣∣ eη(θ)Tα−βγ(η(θ))κ(α,β) Gθ(dθ)×∫
s∈S
ξ(s)σ
∣∣∣∣Λk(ξ(ds))Gs(ds)
∣∣∣∣ τ (σξ(s), δ)eση(θ)T ξ(s)−δγ(η(θ))Gs(ds)
=
∫
ζ∈Ωθ
∣∣∣∣Λk(η(dθ))Gθ(dθ)
∣∣∣∣ eη(θ)Tα−βγ(η(θ))κ(α,β) Gθ(dθ)×∫
s∈S
ξ(s)σ
∣∣∣∣Λk(ξ(ds))Gs(ds)
∣∣∣∣ τ (σξ(s), δ)eση(θ)T ξ(s)−δγ(η(θ))Gs(ds)
=
∫
ζ∈Ωη
eζ
Tα−βδ γ′(ζ)
κ(α,β)
Λk(dζ)
∫
s′∈S′
s′τ ′(s′)
σ
eζ
T s′−γ′(ζ)Λk(ds
′)
=
αδ
σβ
, (15)
where in the penultimate equality we have employed the following change of variables: ζ = η(θ),
s′ = σξ(s), γ′(ζ) = δγ(ζ), τ ′(s′) = τ(s′, δ); and the last equality is a direct application of Lemma 1.
In particular, givenMi,0(·) = V(·;αi+σi
∑ni
p=1 ξ(si,p), βi+niδi), the expectation maximizing action
at time zero coincides with:
ai,0 =
∑ni
p=1 ξ(si,p) +σ
−1
i αi
ni + δ
−1
i βi
. (16)
Subsequently, following her observations of aj,0, j ∈Ni and from her knowledge of her neighbor’s
priors and signal likelihood structure, agent i infers the observed values of
∑nj
p=1 ξ(sj,p) for all her
neighbors. Hence, we get
nj∑
p=1
ξ(sj,p) = (nj + δ
−1
j βj)aj,0−σ−1j αj,∀j ∈Ni. (17)
The observations of agent i are therefore augmented by the set of independent samples from her
neighbors: {∑njp=1 ξ(sj,p) : j ∈Ni}, and her refined belief at time 1 is again a member of the conjugate
family Fγ,η and is give by:
Mi,1(·) = V(·;αi +
∑
j∈Ni
σj
nj∑
p=1
ξ(sj,p), βi +
∑
j∈Ni
njδj).
We can again invoke the linearity of the Bayes estimate for the conjugate family Fγ,η and the
subsequent result in (15), to get that the expected pay-off maximizing action at time 1 is given by:
ai,1 =
δi
(
αi +
∑
j∈Ni σj
∑nj
p=1 ξ(sj,p)
)
σi
(
βi +
∑
j∈Ni njδj
) . (18)
Finally, we can use (17) to replace for the neighboring signals and derive the expression of the
action update of agent i at time 1 in terms of her own and the neighboring actions aj,0, j ∈ Ni;
leading to the expression of linear Bayesian heuristics as claimed in Theorem 1. 
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Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 2. The balancedness of likelihoods (Assumption 3) ensures
that the coefficients of the linear conbination from Corollary 1 sum to one:
∑
j∈Ni Tij = 1, for all
i; thus forming a convex combination as in the DeGroot model. Subsequently, the agents begin
by setting ai,0 =
∑ni
p=1 ξ(si,p)/ni according to (16), and at every t > 1 they update their actions
according to at = Tat−1, where at = (a1,t, . . . ,an,t)T and T is the n×n matrix whose i, j-th entry
is Tij. Next note from the analysis of convergence for DeGroot model, cf. [38, Proporition 1], that
for a strongly connected network G if it is aperiodic (meaning that one is the greatest common
divisor of the lengths of all its circles; and it is the case for us, since the diagonal entries of T
are all non-zero), then limτ→∞ T τ = 1s
T
, where s := (s1, . . . , sn)
T is the unique left eigenvector
associated with the unit eigenvalue of T and satisfying
∑n
i=1 si = 1, si > 0, ∀i. Hence, starting from
non-informative priors agents follow the DeGroot update and if G is also strongly connected, then
they reach a consensus at sTa0 =
∑n
i=1 si(
∑ni
p=1 ξ(si,p)/ni). 
Appendix C: Proof of Theorem 3. We begin by a lemma that determines the so-called
global MVUE for each i, i.e. the MVUE of mi,θ given all the observations of all agents across the
network.
Lemma 2 (Global MVUE). Under the exponential family signal-utility structure (Assump-
tion 1), the (global) MVUE of mi,θ given the entire set of observations of all the agents across the
network is given by:
a?i =
δi
(
αi +
∑n
j=1 σj
∑nj
p=1 ξ(sj,p)
)
σi
(
βi +
∑n
j=1 njδj
) . (19)
If we further impose non-informative priors (Assumption 2), then the global MVUE for each i can
be rewritten as
a?i =
δi
(∑n
j=1 σj
∑nj
p=1 ξ(sj,p)
)
σi
(∑n
j=1 njδj
) = δi
σi
n∑
j=1
σjnj∑n
p=1 npδp
aj,0. (20)
This lemma can be proved easily by following the same steps that lead to (18) to get (19); making
the necessary substitutions under Assumption 2 yields (20). From (20), it is immediately clear that
if some consensus action is to be the efficient estimator (global MVUE) for all agents i∈ [n], then
we need δiσj = σiδj for all i, j; hence, the global balance is indeed a necessary condition. Under this
condition, the local balance of likelihoods (Assumption 3) is automatically satisfied and given non-
informative priors Theorem 2 guarantees convergence to a consensus in strongly connected social
network. Moreover, we can rewrite (20) as a?i = a
? = (
∑n
j=1 δjnjaj,0)/
∑n
p=1 npδp, for all i. Hence, if
the consensus action (sTa0 in the proof of Theorem 2, Appendix B) is to be efficient then we need
si = δini/
∑n
j=1 njδj for all i; s= (s1, . . . , sn) being the unique normalized left eigenvector associated
with the unit eigenvalue of T : sTT = sT , as defined in Appendix B. Using δiσj = σiδj, we can also
rewrite the coefficients Tij of the DeGroot update in Theorem 2 as Tij = δjnj/(
∑
p∈Ni npδp).
Therefore, by expanding the eigenvector condition sTT = sT we obtain that in order for the
consensus action sTa0 to agree with the efficient consensus a
?, it is necessary and sufficient to have
that for all j
n∑
i=1
siTij =
n∑
i=1
(
δini∑n
j=1 δjnj
)
δjnj[I +A]ij∑
p∈Ni npδp
= sj =
δjnj∑n
j=1 δjnj
, (21)
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or equivalently, ∑
i:j∈Ni
δini∑
p∈Ni npδp
=
∑
i∈Noutj
δini∑
p∈Ni npδp
= 1, (22)
for all j. Under the global balance condition (Assumption 4), δiσj = δjσi, the weights Tij =
δjnj/(
∑
p∈Ni npδp) as given above, correspond to transition probabilities of a node-weighted ran-
dom walk on the social network graph, cf. [16, Section 5]; where each node i ∈ [n] is weighted
by wi = niδi. Such a random walk is a special case of the more common type of random walks
on weighted graphs where the edge weights determine the jump probabilities; indeed, if for any
edge (i, j) ∈ E we set its weight equal to wi,j =wiwj then the random walk on the edge-weighted
graph reduces to a random walk on the node-weighted graph with node weights wi, i ∈ [n]. If the
social network graph is undirected and connected (so that wi,j = wj,i for all i, j), then the edge-
weighted (whence also the node-weighted) random walks are time-reversible and their stationary
distributions (s1, . . . , sn)
T can be calculated in closed form as follows [2, Section 3.2]:
si =
∑
j∈Ni wi,j∑n
i=1
∑
j∈Ni wi,j
. (23)
In a node-weighted random walk we can replace wi,j =wiwj for all j ∈Ni and (23) simplifies into
si =
wi
∑
j∈Ni wj∑n
i=1wi
∑
j∈Ni wj
.
Similarly to (21), the consensus action will be efficient if and only if
si =
wi
∑
j∈Ni wj∑n
i=1wi
∑
j∈Ni wj
=
wi∑n
k=1wk
,∀i,
or equivalently:
(
n∑
k=1
wk)
∑
j∈Ni
wj =
n∑
i=1
(wi
∑
j∈Ni
wj),∀i,
which holds true only if
∑
j∈Ni wj is a common constant that is the same for all agents, i.e.∑
j∈Ni wj =
∑
j∈Ni δjnj = C
′ > 0 for all i ∈ [n]. Next replacing in (22) yields that, in fact, C ′ =∑
i∈Noutj
δini for all j, completing the proof for the conditions of efficiency. 
Appendix D: Proof of Theorem 4. We address the more general case of (5), which includes
(12) as a special case (with common uniform priors). For any pair of states θˆ and θˇ, define the log
ratio of beliefs, likelihoods, and priors as follows:
φi,t(θˆ, θˇ) := log
(
µi,t(θˆ)/µi,t(θˇ)
)
,
λi(θˆ, θˇ) := log
(
`i(si|θˆ)/`i(si|θˇ)
)
,
γi(θˆ, θˇ) := log
(
νi(θˆ)/νi(θˇ)
)
,
By concatenating the log-ratio statistics of the n networked agents, we obtain the following three
vectorizations for the log-ratio statistics:
φt(θˆ, θˇ) := (φ1,t(θˆ, θˇ), . . . ,φn,t(θˆ, θˇ)),
λ(θˆ, θˇ) := (λ1(θˆ, θˇ), . . . ,λn(θˆ, θˇ)),
γ(θˆ, θˇ) := (γ1(θˆ, θˇ), . . . , γn(θˆ, θˇ)).
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Using the above notation, we can rewrite the log-linear belief updates of (5) in a linearized vector
format as shown below:
φt+1(θˆ, θˇ) =(I +A)φt(θˆ, θˇ)−Aγ(θˆ, θˇ)
=(I +A)t+1φ0(θˆ, θˇ)−
t∑
τ=0
(I +A)τAγ(θˆ, θˇ)
=(I +A)t+1
(
λ(θˆ, θˇ) + γ(θˆ, θˇ)
)
−
t∑
τ=0
(I +A)τAγ(θˆ, θˇ)
=(I +A)t+1λ(θˆ, θˇ) +
(
(I +A)t+1−
t∑
τ=0
(I +A)τA
)
γ(θˆ, θˇ).
Next we use the spectral decomposition in (13) to obtain: 1
φt+1(θˆ, θˇ) = (1 + ρ)
t+1r1Λ(θˆ, θˇ) + ((1 + ρ)
t+1−
t∑
τ=0
(1 + ρ)τρ)r1β(θˆ, θˇ) + o((1 + ρ)
t+1)
= (1 + ρ)t+1
(
r1Λ(θˆ, θˇ) + (1−
t∑
τ=0
(1 + ρ)τ−t−1ρ)r1β(θˆ, θˇ) + o(1)
)
→ (1 + ρ)t+1r1Λ(θˆ, θˇ), (24)
where we adopt the following notations for the global log likelihood and prior ratio statistics:
β(θˆ, θˇ) := αTγ(θˆ, θˇ) and Λ(θˆ, θˇ) := αTλ(θˆ, θˇ); furthermore, in calculation of the limit in the last
step of (24) we use the geometric summation identity
∑∞
τ=0 ρ(1 + ρ)
τ−1 = 1.
To proceed denote Λ(θˆ) :=
∑n
i=1αi`i(si|θˆ) so that Λ(θˆ, θˇ) = Λ(θˆ)−Λ(θˇ). Since Θ♦ consists of
the set of all maximizers of Λ(θˆ), we have that Λ(θˆ, θˇ)< 0 whenever θˇ ∈Θ♦ and θˆ 6∈Θ♦. Next recall
from (24) that φt+1(θˆ, θˇ) → (1 + ρ)t+1r1Λ(θˆ, θˇ) and r1 is the right Perron-Frobenius eigenvector
with all positive entries; hence, for all θ˜ ∈Θ♦ and any θˆ, φi,t(θˆ, θ˜)→−∞ if θˆ 6∈Θ♦ and φi,t(θˆ, θ˜) = 0
whenever θˆ ∈Θ♦; or equivalently, µi,t(θˆ)/µi,t(θ˜)→ 0 for all θˆ 6∈Θ♦, while µi,t(θˆ) = µi,t(θ˜) for any
θˆ ∈Θ♦. The latter together with the fact that∑ ˜θ∈Θµi,t(θ˜) = 1 for all t implies that with probability
one: limt→∞µi,t(θ˜) = 1/|Θ♦|,∀θ˜ ∈Θ♦ and limt→∞µi,t(θ˜) = 0,∀θ˜ 6∈Θ♦ as claimed in the Theorem.
In the special case that Θ♦ is a singleton, {θ♦}= Θ♦, we get that limt→∞µi,t(θ♦) = 1 almost surely
for all i∈ [n].
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